Electronic money and the future of central banks by Ed Stevens
customer’s payment. With the exception
of credit cards, all are simply electronic
methods of transferring depository 
institution liabilities from one account 
to another. 
Prospects for EFT excited interest in the
1970s about the implications for the
business of banking, the convenience of
consumer and commercial users, and the
effectiveness of government regulation,
including monetary policy. The utility of
EFT has been demonstrated by its incor-
poration into the daily fabric of most
people’s economic lives. Whereas in
1979, retail electronic payments were
estimated to represent only about 15 per-
cent of all U.S. retail payments, a recent
study suggests that as much as 40 per-
cent of such transactions are electronic.1
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devices may replace paper currency
and checks—some day. Indeed, 
electronic methods of transferring
money have become widely used.
Recently, however, discussion of 
“electronic money” has taken a new
turn, zeroing in on the extent to
which holding new forms of elec-
tronic money eventually could make
central banks obsolete, rendering
them powerless to control inflation.
This Commentary updates the old
story of electronic funds transfers
before introducing the new story 
of electronic money holdings as a
metaphor for a larger question about
the future of central banking.
Readers may think they’ve heard it all
before: Computers and telecommunica-
tions devices are going to replace paper
currency and checks. And they may—
some day. Thirty or forty years ago, talk
centered on electronic methods of trans-
ferring money, many of which have
become widely used. In recent years,
however, discussion of “electronic
money” has taken a new turn. An
intense, mostly academic debate has
zeroed in on the extent to which holding
new forms of electronic money eventu-
ally could make central banks obsolete,
rendering them powerless to control
inflation. This Economic Commentary
updates the old story of electronic funds
transfers (EFT) before introducing the
new story of electronic money holdings.
Finally, it explains how this new story is
a metaphor for a larger question about
the long-run future of central banking.
■ Electronic Funds Transfers
The traditional EFT story concerns the
application of electronics to making
payments. “Electronification” has been
improving the efficiency and cost of
making paper-based check and currency
payments since the first commercial
electronic applications. In the case of
checks, magnetic ink character recogni-
tion (MICR) encoding in the 1950s
made high-speed check sorting possible,
while telecommunication of digital
check records now promises even faster
check collection. Electronics also facili-
tates currency payments. Since the early
1970s, the ubiquitous ATM has been
spitting out currency in return for an
electronic debit to a customer’s deposit
or loan account. Sophisticated currency-
sorting machines detect worn out and
counterfeit paper, and, at least at this
Bank, robots store and retrieve incoming
and outgoing shipments of currency
within the steel latticework of an auto-
mated vault.
EFT, however, always has been touted as
more than the application of electronics
to the processing of checks and currency.
It has meant replacing paper checks and
currency with purely paperless elec-
tronic transactions. Of course, large-
value, low-volume paperless interbank
payments have been a force in our 
financial structure since 1918, when 
the Federal Reserve Banks inaugurated 
telegraphic funds transfer service for
member banks. Today, Fedwire, the
Reserve Banks’wire transfer service,
and CHIPS, another private service, 
handle about $2 trillion in electronic
payments daily. 
For retail payments, the automated 
clearinghouse (ACH) has been the
mechanism for low-value, high-volume
items only since the 1960s, competing
mostly with checks. Typically, ACH has
been used for sending and receiving 
routine debits (such as life insurance 
premiums and mortgage payments) 
and credits (such as wage and salary
payments) to bank customers’deposit
accounts. Increasingly, however, cus-
tomers are employing ACH payments 
to carry out such nonroutine transactions
as telephone and online bill payments
and point-of-sale check truncation. In
addition, retail card networks are facili-
tating the use of debit cards for true
“point-of-sale” electronic transfers
directly from a customer’s deposit
account to a merchant’s account. Credit
cards operate the same way, using a loan
instead of a deposit balance to fund the■ Electronic Money
As routine as electronic money transfers
have become in the payments system,
the prospect of new forms of electronic
money holdings suggests new chal-
lenges. The term “electronic money”
has come to refer to devices such as
stored-value cards and network money.
Both forms have been used in a small
number of experimental applications
involving the electronic transmission of
payment messages and, in that respect,
are no different from EFT. One feature
that distinguishes electronic money,
however, is that, like traveler’s checks,
the values being transferred need not
represent the liabilities of private depos-
itory institutions or the currency liabili-
ties of Federal Reserve Banks. Both
banks and nonbanks have experimented
with providing these payments services. 
Value originates in a stored-value—or
“chip-in”—card when the card owner
pays the provider some form of money
to “fuel” the card. After that, an exchange
of electrons between the memories of
two persons’cards conveys information
needed to effect a payment. In this way,
stored-value-card transactions might
economize on time-consuming interbank
clearing and settlement systems of
checks or the costly real-time telecom-
munications apparatus of debit and credit
cards. Such networks might be unneces-
sary because the cards themselves would
indicate whether payers have sufficient
balances, and their exchange of electrons
would accomplish both clearing and set-
tlement. Of course, some overhead func-
tions would remain, but no cumbersome
infrastructure like that of counting, test-
ing, shipping, and storing paper currency
would seem to be needed. 
Network money is slightly different,
being an artifact of the Internet. Again,
customers fuel their accounts by paying
a service provider with some form of
money. Thereafter, internet messages
accomplish payments by ordering 
transfers of value directly between 
a provider’s account holders. 
In principle, both stored-value cards and
network money someday might replace
existing forms of currency and deposits
as stores of value from which payments
are made, even though initial experience
in the United States has not been very
promising. However, currency is the
dominant liability of the Federal
Reserve Banks and finances much of
their portfolio of Treasury securities.
Earnings on these securities are the
Reserve Banks’dominant source of
income, most of which is paid to the
U.S. Treasury as seigniorage. If privately
issued electronic money someday were
to displace today’s currency holdings,
the Federal Reserve Banks would lose
close to $30 billion in annual revenue. 
But that isn’t all. Depository institutions
that provide checking account payments
services maintain close to $20 billion in
required plus voluntary excess and clear-
ing account balances at the Reserve
Banks that are used in making interbank
payments. If electronic moneys of non-
bank issuers someday were to displace
bank deposits, the central bank might be
left with no customers for its deposit
facilities, and monetary policy might
seem to be impossible. In most coun-
tries, the central bank undertakes mone-
tary policy by adjusting the supply of its
deposit liabilities to raise or lower short-
term interest rates on competing assets.
Purchasing securities creates more cen-
tral bank base money deposits and
reduces interest rates in the short run;
selling securities does the opposite.
If no one were to want a central bank’s
money, how could it conduct monetary
policy? Market tests of smart cards and
network money, though hardly success-
ful enough to create anxiety about the
matter, have sparked a renewed interest
in this question. Opening salvoes in a
recent debate were even brought together
in 1999 in the journal International
Finance, where several authors looked 
at the long-run implications of electronic
money for the possible eventual obsoles-
cence of central banking.
■ Electronic Money as 
a Metaphor
Concern about the eventual obsolescence
of central banks is based on something
more than the possible future dominance
of nonbank electronic money. Other
applications of computer and telecom-
munications technology already have
had similar effects, making the term
“electronic money” a metaphor for the
effects of a variety of technological
changes in banking and payments. 
One of those changes is the precision
with which depository institutions can
manage their central bank deposits. For
example, computerized information 
systems allow banks to track actual ver-
sus expected inflows and outflows and
manage their end-of-day balances at 
the Federal Reserve more precisely. 
One indication of increased precision is
the decline in banks’excess deposit bal-
ances relative to their in- and out-
payments at the Fed. Although excess
reserves increased about $1 billion
between 1979 and 2000, they declined
from 0.070 percent of the daily value of
transactions processed through deposi-
tories’Reserve Bank accounts in 1979
to 0.052 percent in 2000.
Of course, excess balances are quite
small relative to required reserve and
clearing balances, but required balances
have been declining even more rapidly.
In part, this can be attributed to
advances in banks’computer and
telecommunications capabilities. Sweep
accounts are a good example, automati-
cally “sweeping” bank customers’
deposit balances out of non- or low-
interest-bearing transactions accounts
that are subject to reserve requirements
into overnight holdings of nonreserv-
able, interest-bearing assets. In the
United States, the difference between
the monetary base with and without
adjustment for the required reserves
avoided by sweep accounts was $45 bil-
lion at the end of 2001.
But it’s bigger than that. Just as com-
puter and telecommunications technol-
ogy allows depository institutions to
avoid reserve requirements, so too may
it discourage the holding of bank
deposits and/or stimulate regulators to
cut reserve requirements. The global
reach of modern banks has been pow-
ered, in part, by banks’computer and
telecommunications facilities. What
some might describe as international
regulatory competition and others as the
universal power of markets to defuse
regulation may be moving nations
toward zero reserve requirements, as in
the United Kingdom and Canada. In the
United States, the ratio of required plus
excess reserve balances to the aggregate
value of all debt in the economy has
fallen from 1.75 percent to 0.05 percent
over the past 30 years. Not all of this
decline reflects cuts in reserve require-
ments, or even portfolio shifts designed
to avoid the implicit tax of reserve
requirements. Nonetheless, the dollar
value of reserve balances (excluding
voluntary clearing balances) has fallen
from $23 billion to less than $10 billion
over the past 30 years—$330 billion 
less than if the debt ratio had remained
constant.Suggestions that, in the limit, these
trends could make central banks obso-
lete have met with mixed reactions.
Some authors argue that, while demand
for familiar central bank money may
decline, it will continue to coexist with
nonbank electronic money. Further, as
Charles Freedman has argued, “even in
the unlikely case that the spread of
[stored value cards] led to the elimina-
tion of [central] bank notes and that 
the development of network money 
permitted alternative settlement 
services, central banks would very
likely be able to continue to influence
the policy rate.”2Why? Because central
banks’governmental status makes credit
risk on their moneys lower than on pri-
vately issued money. Moreover, the cost
of using an equally low-risk government
security as the interbank settlement
medium would be cumbersome.
Another strand of the debate argues that,
while the demand to hold central bank
deposits might dry up, a central bank
should be able to control short-term
interest rates and conduct monetary 
policy as effectively as it does today.
This case assumes that, although the
demand to hold central bank base
money overnight or longer may dry up,
the demand to use zero-balance
accounts at the central bank in the settle-
ment process would remain. An account
can be used for making and receiving
payments during the day but hit a zero
end-of-day balance target as long as
same-day payments are possible.
Clearly, unless a single monopoly
provider offered all possible payment
services to every payer and payee, a
mechanism would be needed for 
settling payments between alternative
payments service providers or networks.
For example, a household may want to
shift balances from an overloaded smart
card to a network money balance, or
from a brand of network money typically
used in online auctions to another brand
used for online airline reservations. 
A central bank will have a decided
advantage in maintaining its position as
the preferred settlement agent for inter-
network payments if—and this might be
a big if—the government continues to
use the central bank as its fiscal agent.
In addition, if the central bank remains 
a governmental institution, with the
creditworthiness that position com-
mands, then it will have another com-
petitive advantage. Of course, a central
bank could be disadvantaged if legisla-
tion were to impose costs that out-
weighed these competitive advantages.
For example, a central bank might find
its competitive position eroded if laws
prohibited it from participating directly
in some kinds of private, nonbank pay-
ments networks. The same result might
follow if network providers faced arbi-
trary and costly reserve requirements on
their transferable liabilities because
they used the central bank’s deposit and
settlement system. 
The point is that, putting aside potential
hurdles, account holders in a net debit
position over the course of a day would
want to bring sufficient funds into their
settlement accounts to cover their net
need to pay others. At the same time,
the remaining account holders would be
in a net credit position and want to take
an equivalent amount of funds out of
their accounts. Money market trading
between the two sets of institutions
ordinarily might ensure that each and
every institution would satisfy its desire
for a zero balance. The question is, how
could a central bank influence the price
at which balances trade? One way
would be through a Lombard facility
that establishes an upper-bound loan
rate and a lower-bound deposit rate as
the range within which money market
rates would trade. Another would be to
conduct open market operations in the
money market, creating temporary
intraday deficits or surpluses of settle-
ment funds as a way to influence mar-
ket interest rates. Finally, even if the
central bank were not the settlement
bank, issuing and redeeming its own
interest-bearing liabilities might give it
control over money market rates.
A related line of thought takes a more
direct approach. The reasoning is that,
whatever the relative merits of elec-
tronic and traditional moneys, govern-
ments may be counted on to preserve
the roles of central bank currency and
deposit liabilities. The alternative—loss
of seigniorage revenue, loss of direct
supervisory power over the safety and
soundness of money, and loss of mone-
tary policy influence over the inflation
rate—might be too unpalatable for a
government to tolerate. The Federal
Reserve has not taken this position,
instead maintaining a policy that it not
inhibit the evolution of electronic pay-
ments innovations by regulation. The
European Central Bank (ECB) provides
a counterexample, reflecting a concern
that growth of new electronic moneys
might compromise both the safety of
the public’s money holdings and the
ECB’s control of the price level.3 ECB
regulations preserve the role of central
bank base money, at least in the short
run, by allowing only credit institutions
subject to reserve requirements the
right to provide electronic money. The
regulations also require frequent report-
ing by credit institutions, making it pos-
sible to track electronic money balances
and incorporate them into the monetary
aggregates.
Suppose that users of money were to
stop using central bank money and set-
tlement accounts, and that governments
did not preserve the roles of currency
and central bank deposits. What then?
Presumably, competing private suppli-
ers of payments services would have
emerged, with their services attached to
some variety of deposits, credit lines,
and stored values. In the United States,
for example, the dollar might disappear
as a unit of account, replaced by units
of Money1, Money2, etc., whose values
could be compared only in terms of the
units of goods, services, and assets they
commanded in the marketplace. 
One view—typically associated with
Milton Friedman—is that such a world
would be inconsistent with stable
prices.4 Essentially, the argument is that
competition among suppliers of pure
fiduciary money would send prices to
infinity because the marginal cost at
which each supplier could issue an
extra unit of its money always would be
zero, leading to an infinite supply and
infinite price level. At least as persua-
sive may be the alternative view: Com-
peting moneys would be branded by the
identity of their producers. Competition
for customers would be based on qual-
ity, gauged by the predictability of each
brand’s exchange value for goods, ser-
vices, and assets. Additions to any one
producer’s money supply would have a
positive and increasing marginal cost in
the form of that brand’s reduced qual-
ity. Thus, competing money issuers
would be analogous to competing cen-
tral banks, each of whose ability to
issue money without degradation in
quality depends on its ability to main-
tain a predictable purchasing power. 
As long as customers appreciated price
stability, the outcome of competitive
private moneys might approximate 
that of today’s public-service-based
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In the United States, stored-value-card
and network money projects have
enjoyed only limited success. However,
the electronic money debate does not
hinge on the remote possibility that
most monetary instruments might some
day be issued by institutions other than
depository institutions. Even if money
remains the preserve of depository
institutions, there is ample evidence of a
shrinking demand for deposits at the
central bank. In the limit, if demand for
central bank money were to continue
shrinking, how could a central bank
influence interest rates to carry out
monetary policy?
A central bank that cannot influence
interest rates may seem too absurd 
to contemplate, given our modern 
proclivity for thinking that government
can and should fix anything that seems
to be broken. Surely a financial system
in which the central bank couldn’t
implement monetary policy should be
reformed. Or perhaps not, we hear again
from one corner of the electronic money
debate—price stability might be possible
without a central bank.
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